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Abstract
Go¨del Incompleteness Theorem leaves open a way around it, vaguely perceived for a long
time but not clearly identified. (Thus, Go¨del believed informal arguments can answer any math
question.) Closing this loophole does not seem obvious and involves Kolmogorov complexity.
(This is unrelated to, well studied before, complexity quantifications of the usual Go¨del effects.)
I consider extensions U of the universal partial recursive predicate (or, say, Peano Arithmetic).
I prove that any U either leaves an n-bit input (statement) unresolved or contains nearly all
information about the n-bit prefix of any r.e. real ρ (which is n bits for some ρ). I argue
that creating significant information about a specific math sequence is impossible regardless of
the methods used. Similar problems and answers apply to other unsolvability results for tasks
allowing multiple solutions, e.g., non-recursive tilings.
1 Introduction.
D.Hilbert asked if Peano Arithmetic (PA: consisting of logic and algebraic axioms and an infinite
family of Induction Axioms) can be consistently extended to a complete theory. The question was
somewhat vague since an obvious answer was “yes”: just add to PA axioms a maximal consistent
set, clearly existing albeit hard to find.1 K.Go¨del formalized this question as existence, among such
extensions, of recursively enumerable (r.e.) ones and gave it a negative answer. Its mathematical
essence is the absence of total recursive extensions of universal partial recursive predicates (p.r.p.).
This negative answer apparently was never accepted by Hilbert, and Go¨del himself had reservations:
“Namely, it turns out that in the systematic establishment of the axioms of mathematics,
new axioms, which do not follow by formal logic from those previously established, again
and again become evident. It is not at all excluded by the negative results mentioned
earlier that nevertheless every clearly posed mathematical yes-or-no question is solvable
in this way. For it is just this becoming evident of more and more new axioms on the
basis of the meaning of the primitive notions that a machine cannot imitate.” [Go¨del 61]
As is well known, [Barzdin 69, Jockusch, Soare 72], the absence of algorithmic solutions is no
obstacle when the task does not make a solution unique.2 A notable example is generating strings
of linear Kolmogorov complexity, e.g., those that cannot be compressed to half their length. Algo-
rithms fail, but a set of dice does a perfect job! Thus, while r.e. sets of axioms cannot complete PA,
completion by other realistic means remained an open possibility: one can so construct an r.e. the-
ory R that, like PA, allows no consistent completion with r.e. axiom sets. Yet, R allows a recursive
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1I assume PA is consistent: a separate can of worms.
2Note that no such problems arise for the less dramatic version of Go¨del Theorem which makes the completion
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set of pairs of axioms such that random choice of one in each pair assures such completion with
probability 99%. This cannot be done for PA itself. In fact, [Stephan 06] shows that any Martin-Lo¨f
random sequence that computes (i.e. allows computing from it) a consistent completion of PA also
computes the Halting Problem H; and by [dLMSS 56], only a recursive sequence (which H is not)
can be computed with a positive probability by randomized algorithms.
Of course, Go¨del did not envision Math axioms to be chosen at random :-).
But for arbitrary, not random, PA completions the reduction arguments do not work:
only a recursive predicate can be computed from all consistent completions of PA.
However, the impossibility of a task can be formulated more generically. [Kolmogorov 65] de-
fined a concept of mutual information in two finite strings. It can be refined and extended to
infinite sequences, so that it satisfies conservation inequalities: cannot be increased by deterministic
algorithms or in random processes or with any combinations of both. In fact, it seems reasonable
to assume that no physically realizable process can increase information about a specific sequence.
In this framework one can ask if non-mechanical means could really enable the Hilbert-Go¨del
task of consistent completion for PA (as they can for the artificial system R just mentioned).
A negative answer follows from the existence of a specific sequence ρ that has infinite mutual
information with each total extension of a universal p.r.p. ρ plays a role of a password: no substantial
information about it can be guessed, no matter what methods are allowed.
Note that invoking Go¨del’s name, does not mean my intent to consider widely discussed com-
plexity aspects and implications of incompleteness theorem. In particular, I ignore complexity of
completions of PA. Much of this was considered in the 60-s,3 but does not answer our question: are
such completions really possible? Strings of any complexity are easy to generate.
There are other interesting situations with a similar gap between the proven result and its usual
interpretation. Let me mention tiling, a cute task studied in many areas of CS, Math, Physics, etc.
A tile is a unit size square with colored edges. A palette is a finite set of tiles with copies of which
one can tile the plane so that adjacent edges match in colors. Classical papers by Berger, Meyers,
and others constructed palettes P that can tile an infinite plane, but only non-recursively, which
is typically interpreted as an impossibility of tiling. There, any program t : IN2→P can tile only
finitely many frames F = {(i, j) : max(|i|, |j|)=n}, ‖F‖
df
=n so that t|F appear on P -tiled planes.
[Durand, Levin, Shen 01] pushes these results to the limit, with a P for which ‖F‖ < ‖t‖.
Such palettes, thus, only allow tilings with frames of linear complexity. This stronger result,
though, makes the standard interpretation suspicious: may these frames be just random, thus easy
to generate with dice? Or could more sophisticated and yet realistic means work?
For some palettes this is, indeed, the case, but not for all. Like all co-r.e. sets, the set of planar
tilings with any given palette has members with information about any specific sequence growing
with radius n as slowly as log n. Still, this bound cannot be improved for some palettes.
The same holds for complete extensions of universal p.r.p. and formal systems. Thus, Go¨del
Theorem is not really misleading. The proof of this (much trickier than Go¨del’s) is the main point
of this article. The interpretation of these results relies on Independence Postulate — an extended
form of Church-Turing Thesis discussed in the last section. It is much stronger and can be applied
where CT cannot. Other examples are results of [L 16] or older ones in [L 84].
3The original publications, such as [Barzdin 68], gave the technical cores of the results and avoided discussion of
straightforward implications for formal theories, Go¨del Theorem, etc. These implications were discussed in talks, e.g.,
mentioned in [Kolmogorov 72] with some technical references. Also, extensive discussions were subsequently made by
G. Chaitin. I omit details, since these results are only superficially related to the issues I address here.
2
2 Complexity Tools.
Informal Overview. A universal measure m is a largest up to a constant factor enumerable by
algorithms probability distribution. Its entropy (− log of probability) is Kolmogorov Complexity
K; it is also the least length of programs generating x. Rarity d(x|µ) of x for a measure µ is
− log µ(x) minus complexity of x, i.e., the difference between entropies of µ and m for x. Mutual
information in x, y is K(x)+K(y)−K(x, y): it allows to encode x, y together with fewer bits than
separately. It is also their non-independence: rarity for distribution m(x)m(y) (universal on each,
but independent on the pair). It satisfies conservation inequalities: cannot be increased in processing
x, by deterministic algorithms, random transformations, any their combinations, etc.
Conventions. Let R, IQ, IN, B={0, 1}, S=B∗, Ω=B IN be, respectively, the sets of non-negative
reals, rationals, integers, bits, finite, and infinite binary sequences; x[n] is the n-bit prefix and ‖x‖
is the bit-length of x∈S. A real function f and its values are enumerable or r.e. (−f is co-r.e. ) if
its subgraph {(x, q) : f(x) > q ∈ IQ} is. Elementary (f∈E) are functions f : Ω→ IQ depending on
a finite number of digits. [A]
df
=1 if a statement A holds, else [A]
df
=0. I identify objects (e.g., integers)
with their binary encodings; x∈S with E functions ω 7→ [x=ω[n]] for n=‖x‖, etc. Majorant is an
r.e. function largest, up to a constant factor, among r.e. functions in its class. ≺f , ≻f , and ≍f
denote <f+O(1), >f−O(1), =f±O(1), respectively.
2.1 Integers: Complexity, Randomness.
Let us define Kolmogorov complexity K(x) as ⌊1− logm(x)⌋ where m : IN→ R is the universal
measure, i.e., a majorant r.e. function with
∑
xm(x)≤1. It was introduced in [ZL 70], and noted
in [L 73, L 74, Gacs 74] to be a modification (restriction to self-delimiting codes) of the least
length of binary programs for x defined in [Kolmogorov 65]. While technically different, m relies
on intuition similar to that of [Solomonoff 64]. The proof of the existence of the largest function
was a straightforward modification of proofs in [Solomonoff 64, Kolmogorov 65] which have been a
keystone of the informational complexity theory.
For x∈IN, y∈IN or y∈Ω, similarly, m(·|·) is the largest r.e. real function with
∑
xm(x|y)≤1;
K(x|y)
df
=⌊1− logm(x|y)⌋ (= the least length of self-delimiting programs transforming y into x).
[Kolmogorov 65] defines rarity (non-randomness) d(x) of uniformly distributed x as ‖x‖−K(x).
Our modified K allows extending this to other measures µ on IN. A µ-test is f : IN→ R with mean
µ(f)≤1 (and, thus, small values f(x) on randomly chosen x). For computable µ, a majorant r.e. test
is m(x)/µ(x). This suggests defining d(x|µ) as ⌈log ⌈m(x)/µ(x)⌉⌉ ≍ max{0, ⌈− log µ(x)⌉ −K(x)}.
2.2 Integers: Information.
In particular, x=(a, b) distributed with µ=m ⊗ m, is a pair of two independent, but otherwise
completely generic, finite objects. Then, I(a : b)
df
=d((a, b)|m ⊗ m)=K(a)+K(b)−K(a, b) is seen
as dependence and also measures mutual information in a, b. It was shown (see [ZL 70]) by
Kolmogorov and Levin to be close (within ±O(logK(a, b))) to the expression K(a)−K(a|b) of
[Kolmogorov 65]. Our I equals ≍ K(a)−K(a|(b,K(b))). Unlike the 1965 expression (see [Gacs 74]),
it is symmetric, monotone: I(a : b) ≺ I((a, a′) : b) (which will allow extending I to Ω), and
satisfies the following Independence Conservation inequalities [L 74, L 84]: For any computable
transformation A, measure µ, and some family ta,b of µ-tests
I(A(a) : b) ≺ I(a : b), I((a,w) : b) ≺ I(a : b) + log ta,b(w).
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(The O(1) error terms reflect the constant complexities of A,µ.) So, independence of a from b
is preserved in random processes, in deterministic computations, their combinations, etc. These
inequalities are not obvious (and false for the original 1965 expression I(a : b)=K(a)−K(a/b) )
even with A, say, simply cutting off half of a. An unexpected aspect of I is that x contains all
information about k=K(x), I(x : k) ≍ K(k), despite K(k|x) being ∼‖k‖ or ∼ log ‖x‖, in the worst
case [Gacs 74]. One can view this as an “Occam Razor” effect: with no initial information about
it, x is as hard to obtain as its simplest (k-bit) description.
All this works as well for the Iz variation of I allowing all algorithms access to oracle z.
2.3 Complexity, Randomness, and Information for Reals.
We now extend these concepts to reals α∈Ω. This abstraction is often convenient (if not taken too
far) for concealing O(1) terms and other small mismatches in formulas for finite objects.
Reals: Randomness. A measure on Ω is a function µ(x)=µ(x0)+µ(x1), for x∈S. Its mean µ(f)
is a linear functional on E : µ(f+g)=µ(f)+µ(g). It extends to other functions, as usual. µ-tests are
lower semicontinuous f , µ(f)≤1; computable µ have universal (i.e., majorant r.e.) Martin-Lo¨f
tests Tµ(α)=
∑
im(α[i])/µ(α[i]). Random are α∈Ω with rarity d(α|µ)
df
=⌈log ⌈Tµ(α)⌉⌉<∞.
Random R.e. Reals. P. Martin-Lo¨f noted that some random reals are definable in arithmetic.
In fact, the least real L∈[0, 1] with minimal rarity (see, e.g., [ZL 70], section 4.4) is random
and r.e. If (Y+Z)/X∈IQ, we say X dominates r.e. reals Y,Z (Solovay reducibility, [Solovay 75,
Downey, Hirschfeldt 10]). By [Kucera, Slaman 01], random are exactly those r.e. reals that domi-
nate all others.4 Any random r.e. ρ is
∑
nm(n) for some universal m: ρ dominates all such sums
and replacing m with m+x/i for an r.e. x concentrated in 0, preserves universality. [Chaitin 75]
contains probably the first published discussion of randomness of
∑
nm(n).
Reals: Information. [L 74] extends I to reals as I(α : β)
df
=⌈log ⌈
∑
i,j m(i|α)m(j|β)2
I(i:j)⌉⌉.
(As always, we average in the linear scale and switch to the logarithmic scale for the final expression.)
For α, β ∈ IN, this equals our previous expression ≍ K(α)+K(β)−K(α, β) since both satisfy the
Independence Conservation Inequalities. In fact, this extension of I to Ω is the smallest satisfying
the independence conservation. It suffices for the present paper and is used hereafter.
For other applications of Independence Postulate mentioned at the end, a stronger (larger)
expression can be used [L 84, L 12]. It defines I(α : β) as d((α, β)|M⊗M), whereM is the universal
r.e. distribution on Ω (i.e., semimeasure: M(x)≥M(x0)+M(x1)). This requires a (quite tricky)
extension of the definition of rarity d from computable measures to r.e. distributions.
4Indeed, let X=L+Y , T be an r.e. test with T (X)=∞, Y=supi yi, L=supi li, T=
∑
i
ti; li, yi, ti computable.
We can choose T with ti(r) non-increasing for r≥li+yi. Then T
′(r)
df
=
∑
i
ti(r + yi) is an r.e. test with T
′(L)=∞.
Conversely, let Z,X ∈ [0, 1] be enumerated as Z=supi zi, X=
∑
i xi. Let sk,i=max{zi, sk,i−1+xi/2
k} and
tk(V )
df
=2k supi[zi≤V <sk,i]. Then tk and T=
∑
k
tk/k
2 are r.e. tests. Let yi=sk,i−(sk,i−1+xi/2
k), and Y=
∑
i
yi.
Sk=supi sk,i=X/2
k+Y dominates X. If Z 6=Sk for all k, then zi≤Z<sk,i for some i, so tk(Z)=2
k and T (Z)=∞.
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3 Consistent Objects.
Consistency of theories and of other objects can be expressed as membership in co-r.e. sets of reals.
It is convenient to define such sets via co-r.e. trees, i.e., infinite sets T⊂S containing all prefixes
and some extensions of each member. Let T˜ be the set of those ω ∈ Ω with all prefixes in T .
Some co-r.e. trees have only strings of linear Kolmogorov complexity. Contrast this with
Proposition 1 For each β ∈ Ω, each co-r.e. tree T has α ∈ T˜ with I(α[n] : β) ≺ 5 log n.
Lemma 1 For each co-r.e. tree T there is a measure µ(x)=µ(x0)+µ(x1) with µ(T˜ ) > 1/2,
computable as µ(x)=G(x, ρ[5 log ‖x‖]) by an algorithm G using 5 log ‖x‖ digits of a hint ρ ∈ Ω.
Lemma 1 implies Proposition 1. Indeed, algorithms can transform uniform distribution of inputs
ω into any computable one; same holds for computations with oracle ρ. Consider an algorithm
using ρ to compute µ and transforming ω into a µ-distributed α (∈ T˜ with high probability).
I(ρ[O(log ‖x‖)] : β) = O(log ‖x‖); random ω cannot add information with high probability, and the
algorithm cannot increase it either (due to conservation inequalities).
Proof of Lemma 1: G uses ρ to list all converging k-bit programs. As [Barzdin 68] noted, for
this it needs just one of them, the slowest. ρ can be any r.e. real with K(ρ[n])=k=n−o(n), e.g., a
random one. Programs that use ρ[n] waiting for enumeration of ρ’s lower bounds to exceed ρ[n], are
slower than any programs P of complexity < k−2 log n: otherwise ρ[n] can be generated from P, n.
G computes µ recursively in slices µi(x) for ‖x‖=n=2
2i , assuming µi−1 already computed.
It will approximate T ∩Bn as Ti=Ti(ρ) by limited co-enumeration and distribute µi−1(x) uniformly
on all xy∈Ti (which always exist for x∈T ) or, if none, on x0
∗∈Bn. Let hi be the Shannon entropy
of µi, with the fractional part rounded up to 2 log 2i bits. Given µi−1, shrinking Ti lowers hi.
G uses ρ to compute the (lexicographically) least possible h1, . . . , hi and co-enumerates T≤i
until reaching these bounds. Rounding hi, leaves a fraction fi of x ∈ Ti \ T . Yet,
∑
i fi < 1/2.
In particular, randomized algorithms can generate strings of length ≥ n of any co-r.e. tree T
with probability 1/k2n, k=⌈log n⌉ by guessing k, ⌊log ‖T ∩B2
k
‖⌋.
3.1 Example: Tiling
An illustration is the tiling question from the introduction. [Durand, Levin, Shen 01] constructs a
palette P forcing, on each P -tiling, high complexity of all horizontal tile strings not crossing one
specific column. The same construction works if complexity restriction is replaced with membership
in any bi-tree, i.e., a (co-r.e.) tree containing all substrings (not only prefixes) of its members. To
use it, we need to encode any co-r.e. tree T as an equivalent bi-tree T2.
Let b(2k(2l+1))
df
= (l mod 2). The pattern of b(n) for 2a consecutive n determines the a−2 tail
bits of n. Let i double each bit of i and alter the result’s first bit. If n ends with k followed by ‖k‖,
let sf(n)
df
=k. Let T˜1 be a tree of sequences α : IN→B
2 such that α(n)=(b(n), t) and for some s∈T˜ ,
whenever sf(n) is defined, t=s(sf(n)). Let T2 be a bi-tree of all segments of members of T˜1. Each
n-bit T2-string represents the first n/O(‖n‖
2) bits5 of a T -string s.
In particular, T (and T2) can force s to be random i.e., have maximal complexity. This illustrates
the point: all such tilings are highly non-recursive, yet they are easy to generate (with dice). They
can be expressed in a formal system that allows trivial completions but no recursive ones.
5Optimizing i coding to ‖i‖=K(i) improves the overhead ‖n‖2 to 1/m(‖n‖) but cannot eliminate it.
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4 The Taboo.
This example does not show that all co-r.e. trees, such as tilings with an arbitrary palette, allow
easily generated members. Proposition 1 sets a small but growing bound on the information needed
for that, leaving open the question the article started with. It is resolved by the following observation
central to this paper. We represent in Ω partial predicates as their graphs listed in arbitrary order.
Let u be a universal partial recursive predicate (p.r.p.).
Theorem 1 Let ρ∼n be an n+K(n) bit prefix of a random r.e. real ρ and U be a partial predicate
that on Bn is a total extension6 Un of u. Then I(U : ρ∼n) ≻ n−K(K(n)|n).
This statement that Un carries almost all information on ρn (or equivalently, on the domain size
dn of u|Bn ) may seem paradoxical. Indeed, Andrei Muchnik noted that only a recursive sequence
can be computed from all total extensions U of u. Laurent Bienvenu noted that some such U have
K(ρn|U) ∼ n. The explanation is that unlocking information in Un to compute ρn requires also
knowing K(Un). [Gacs 74] ingeniously proves that K(K(x)|x) can be ∼ log(‖x‖), i.e., ∼ n for
x = Un. Theorem 1 provides an alternative proof of this.
Muchnik’s observation does not apply to sequences with computable complexities: indeed by
[Stephan 06], any Martin-Lo¨f random sequence that computes a total extension of u, also computes
the domain of u. Of course, I do not assume the axioms chosen by math community to be random!
Proof. We define a p.r.p. P : S→B inductively on Bn. If P (x) is defined on [0n, x−1], let Mx,i
denote the combined universal measure
∑
Qm(Q|n) of all total predicates Q on B
n that agree with
P on [0n, x−1] and Q(x)6=i∈B. Then P (x) enumerates lower bounds for Mx,i until either exceeds
2−n and yields P (x)=i, decreasing
∑
iMx+1,i by >2
−n. For some xn, Mxn,i≤2
−n and P diverges
on [xn, 1
n] with
∑
Qm(Q|n)≤2/2
n for all total extensions Q of P on Bn.
For all suchQ, this bound allows 2n/O(1)-fold increase ofm(Q|xn),
7 compared to justm(Q|n) =
m(K(n)|n)m(Q)/O(m(n)). Now, u(px), with a fixed p, computes P (x), and U(px) extends P (x)
on Bn to a total Qn, with m(Qn|U) = m(n)/O(1). Also, xn, ρ∼n,K(n) = ‖ρ∼n‖−n are r.e., so
can be computed from one of them whose enumeration ends latest. This could only be ρ∼n, being
random and long enough to dominate in complexity (which computations cannot increase).
Thus, m(Qn|ρ∼n) = m(Qn|xn)/O(1) = 2
nm(K(n)|n)m(Qn)/O(m(n)). Then, I(U : ρ∼n) ≥
log(m(Qn|ρ∼n)m(Qn|U)/m(Qn)) ≻ log 2
nm(K(n)|n) ≻ n−K(K(n)|n).
Since random strings contain k bits of information about ρ only with probability 2−k and
algorithms do not increase information (due to the Conservation Inequalities), Theorem 1 implies
Corollary 1 The probability that a randomized algorithm computes on Bn a total extension
of u is at most O(2−n)/m(K(n)|n). (Strengthening the o(1) bound of [Jockusch, Soare 72].)
(Thus, not all palettes, formal theories, etc. allow randomness-based tilings, completions, etc.)
While nobody envisioned choosing fundamental Math axioms by coin flips, Theorem 1 supports
a more general impossibility. Just like the usual interpretation of Go¨del Theorem is a matter of
accepting Church-Turing Thesis, judging if Theorem 1 makes the completion task impossible is a
matter of accepting the Independence Postulate discussed below.
6One can weaken this total extension condition to being consistent with u and defined on the specific input pxn
if the simple I of [L 74] is strengthened to one of [L 84] and M(P (0‖x‖) . . . P (x−1)) replaces mx,i in P of the proof.
7This also means n≍In(xn : Q)≺In(dn : Q) (and already implies Corollary 1, even simplifies its bound to O(2
−n)
). So, K(dn|(Q,K(Q|n)) ≍ 0 thus dn can be computed from Un,K(Un|n), if not from Un itself.
6
5 The Independence Postulate.
IP: Let X be a sequence defined with an n-bit mathematical statement (e.g., in PA or set theory),
and a sequence Y can be located in the physical world with a k-bit instruction set (e.g., ip-address).
Then I(X : Y ) < k+n+c, for some small absolute constant c.
(Note that X and Y can each have much more than k+n+c bits of information.)
Thus, a (physical) sequence of all mathematical publications has little information about the
(mathematical) sequence of all true statements of arithmetic. This is of little concern because the
latter has, in turn, little information about the stock market (a physical sequence). :-)
Of course, Kolmogorov information is not the only desirable commodity. Yet, IP has interesting
applications [L 84]. It can be restated as a “finitary” version of the Church-Turing thesis (CT) by
calling recursive those finite sequences with recursive descriptions nearly as short as any their
“higher-level” math descriptions. IP postulates that only such recursive sequences exist in reality.
Let me add (in order of increasing relevance) some comparisons between IP and CT:
1. IP is stated with greater care than CT: Obviously not all strings we generate are algorithmic
(non-communist election results better not be :-). Only mathematically defined strings need
be algorithmic to be generatable. IP includes this math clause explicitly, CT rarely does.
2. IP is simpler, CT more abstract. All sequences we ever see are computable just by being
finite: CT is useless for them! IP works equally well for finite and infinite sequences.
3. IP is easier to support: CT is usually stated with vague reasoning. IP has broad conservation
laws to support it and a general intuition that target information cannot be increased.
4. IP is much more comprehensive: CT prohibits only generating the target math sequence itself;
IP bars all strings with any significant information about it. So, IP can be applied where CT
cannot. See, e.g., [L 84] or more recent results in [L 16].
One application is dousing Go¨del’s hope cited in the Introduction, regardless of any realizable
process of axiom selection. The argument is “inductive”. It seems, complicated processes we observe,
can ultimately be explained, i.e., reduced to simpler ones. These reductions use deterministic models
and random ones, but neither can increase the starting information about a target. The toolkit of
our models may change (e.g., quantum amplitudes work somewhat differently than probabilities)
but it is hard to expect new realistic primitives allowing such “information leaks”.
So, if complicated processes generate unlimited target information, so must do some elementary
processes, that admit no further explanations (reductions to simpler processes). The existence
of such elementary unexplainable information Sources cannot be ruled out. Yet Infidels :-) can
postulate it away. Just like the impossibility of generating power from uniform heat, this is an
unprovable postulate, supported by proven arguments.
Note that the above argument is based on Independence Conservation Inequalities (ICI) of [L 74,
L 84]. They deal with generation of strings by deterministic algorithms or by random processes
from other strings. If the preexisting string has no significant target information, neither will
the generated one. And despite being intuitive, ICI are not technically trivial and should not be
confused with the easy remark that randomized algorithms cannot generate from scratch
information about math targets, such as e.g., r.e. reals. (Math community never tried choosing
their fundamental axioms this way :-). But the difficulty pays off, being essential for the inductive
nature of the support ICI give to IP.
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